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DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS TRANSFER
AND LANDMARKS PRESERVATION-
PROVIDING A SENSE OF ORIENTATION
FREDERICK M. BAKER*
Congress finds and declares . . . that the historical and cultural
foundations of the Nation should be preserved as a living part
of our community life and development in order to give a sense
of orientation to the American people.'
The peculiarity of American institutions is, the fact that they
have been compelled to adapt themselves to the changes of an
expanding people-to the changes involved in crossing a conti-
nent, in winning a wilderness, and in developing at each area
of this progress out of the primitive economic and political con-
ditions of the frontier into the complexity of city life.2
INTRODUCTION
Two events occurred in 1893 that marked a turning point in the
American experience. The Columbian Exposition in Chicago, with
its massive monuments to the Gilded Age, was an express declaration
that Americans had accomplished all that Europe could boast. 3 The
same year, Frederick Jackson Turner presented "The Significance of the
American Frontier in American History" in an address to the Ameri-
can Historical Society.4 From the 1890 census statement that the
* B.A., University of Michigan, 1971; J.D., Washington University, 1975.
1. Act of Aug. 21, 1935, 16 U.S.C. § 470(b) (1970).
2. F. TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 2 (1920) [hereinafter
cited as TURNER]. The Turner thesis concerning the role of the frontier in
American history has been succeeded by theories that reject the search for a
single and unique "American spirit." See, e.g., G. TAYLOR, THE TURNER THESIS
(1949). Nevertheless, the process of continual social ferment that formed the
core of Turner's thesis remains a constant in the American experience. As
Turner himself observed, "each age studies its history anew and with interests
determined by the spirit of the time." TURNER, supra, at 323.
3. For an additional perspective on the statement to the world intended by
the organizers of the Columbian Exposition see Zoll, Superville-New York-
Aspects of Very High Bulk, 14 MAss. REv. 447, 450-56 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Superville].
4. TURNER, supra note 2, at 1 n.l.
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frontier no longer existed, Turner concluded that the historic crucible
of American democracy had disappeared with it.5 The role of the
frontier would now be filled by America's emerging cities: "With
the loss of the frontier, the ability to start again was also lost; Turner
saw in the primitive society of the frontier a tempering force of self-
reliance, individualism and democratization. The loss of the frontier
would turn this force onto the cities."'
As Turner related the significance of the frontier to historians
gathered at the site of the Europe-aping Columbian Exposition, the
finishing touches were being applied to the Old Stock Exchange, a
building representative of what is now referred to as the Chicago
School of Architecture. 7 A movement had arisen from the ashes of
the 1871 Chicago fire introducing "epochal changes" in architecture,
culminating in the modem skyscraper."
Meanwhile, parallel developments were occurring in New York
City that would "transform lower Manhattan from a horizontal to a
vertical city in less than two generations."9 The Equitable Building,
constructed in 1870, the first to incorporate an elevator in its design,
rose to a mere seven stories.'1 In 1915 its 42-story successor was com-
5. Id. at 1-38, passim.
6. Superville, supra note 3, at 453-54: "When the frontier no longer existed,
the energies and confidence that had accomplished its closing were turned to
the development of American cities." d. at 452.
7. J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT xv (1974) [hereinafter cited as SPACE ADRIFT]:
The Exchange, an 1893 gem of Louis Sullivan and Dankmar Adler, ranks
with the most innovative buildings of the Chicago School of Architecture.
In line with the other works of the school, this fragile business palace rede-
fined centuries-long premises of architectural design and established the base-
line for modem architectural forms, the most distinctive of which is the
urban skyscraper.
Id. The Exchange was demolished in 1972 to make way for a "commonplace
forty-five-story office building." Id.
8. Id. at 109. The Chicago School's liberation of American urban architecture
would have been impossible without the development of steel skeleton construc-
tion and the elevator. Buildings were no longer limited in height by the thickness
required of masonry walls and the physical fitness of tenants. See Note, Develop-
ment Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338, 341 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as Development Rights Transfer].
9. Development Rights Transfer, supra note 8, at 341.
10. Id.
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pleted on the same site. 1 The skyscraper was on the ascendant 2
and its coming signalled a new era in land use regulation." Alarmed
by the potential threat to the public safety and welfare posed by the
construction of enormous office buildings in the congested city center,
in 1916 New York City enacted its first zoning ordinance, designed
to establish a "zoning envelope" for each site by placing height, set-
back and area limitations on building size.' 4 Although such regula-
tions established absolute limits on building height and configura-
tion, they controlled neither population density nor the relation
between available access, services and building size.' 5  These
factors were controlled only indirectly by the regulations' bulk limi-
tations16 The initial ordinance was merely a zoning response to a
nuisance problem.
A decade later the Supreme Court sustained a zoning ordinance
designed to establish a comprehensive plan for locating and controlling
the physical development of the community."7 Prior to 1926 land
11. Id. at 338. The second Equitable Building rose 42 stories and cut off the
sunlight from the fronts of buildings of up to 21 stories. Upon proving loss of
rents due to light and air reduction caused by the Equitable Building, most
surrounding owners obtained reduced tax assessments. Id. at 338 n.l, quoting
S. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 71 (1969).
12. Harper's Weekly proclaimed "the age of skyscrapers" in 1894 when the
cross atop Trinity Church lost its title as the highest point in New York.
Development Rights Transfer, supra note 8, at 341 n.23.
13. The history of [the first Equitable Building] and its successor on the
site brackets the beginning and end of the skyscraper's pre-zoning era. By
disclosing the possibility of elevators in office buildings, the first Equitable
Building started the breakout from the traditional five-story maximum. The
following Equitable Building carried the development of the skyscraper
to such intolerable extremes that, beyond any other structure, it may be
isolated as the one building which was a final cause of zoning law.
Id. at 341 n.22, quoting S. TOLL, ZONED AmERICAN 48 (1969).
14. Development Rights Transfer, supra note 8, at 342-43. Height control
regulations of this type had been held constitutional in Welch v. Swasey, 214
U.S. 91 (1909).
15. One hundred thousand people entered the second Equitable Building daily
and 13,000 worked in its 1.25 million square feet of rentable office space.
Development Rights Transfer, supra note 8, at 338 n.1. If New York City were
developed to the densities permitted under the 1916 ordinance, "its residential
districts alone would house seventy-seven million people; the commercial districts
would embrace a working population of three hundred and forty-four million." Id.
at 345.
16. Id. at 343.
17. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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use law consisted merely of the law of private and public nuisance,18
as evidenced by the early New York City zoning ordinance. The
Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.1- recognized ex-
panded municipal authority to implement a master plan for physical
development through zoning regulations enacted pursuant to the
police power.20 State planning enabling legislation, 2 1 however, con-
tained directives to the municipalities that embodied the basic con-
flict between efficient resource utilization on the one hand, and equit-
able allocation of rights between the public and private sectors on
the other.22 The ultimate resolution of the conflict was left to the
municipalities, a task for which they were ill-equipped.
Unfortunately, the passing of the City Beautiful movement, which
had sought to control urban development, 23 roughly coincided with
the first assertions of comprehensive public control over private de-
velopment decisions. Once freed from the City Beautiful movement's
tempering influence, the cities abdicated resolution of the equity-
efficiency dichotomy in favor of market forces, 24 with results predict-
18. See Freilich, Awakening the Sleeping Giant: New Trends and Develop-
ments in Environmental and Land-Use Controls, in INSTITUTE ON PLANNING,
ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 1 (1974).
19. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
20. Although later legislation extended the planning function to counties, it
was always assumed that the municipality would be the arena for the planning
process. D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONIFNT 524 (2d ed.
1971).
21. The Standard Planning Enabling Act became the basic pattern for the
state enabling legislation. See ADvisoRY Cowsia. ON CITY PLANNING & ZONINO,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT (1928),
quoted in D. MANDELKER, supra note 20, at 524.
22. "The plan shall be made with the general purpose of guiding and accom-
plishing a coordinated, adjusted, and harmonious development of the municipality
. . . which will . . . best promote health, safety, morals, order, convenience,
prosperity and general welfare, as well as efficiency and economy of develop-
ment . . . ." ADVISORY Commas. ON CITY PLANNING & ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, A STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT § 7 (1928).
23. The term "City Beautiful" first appeared in the preface to C. ROBINSON,
MODERN CIvic ART, OR THE CITY MADE BEAUTIFUL (1903), and represented
goals of "urban hygiene," achieved by combining utility with beauty in public
works and curbing the unbridled development of large buildings. Superville,
supra note 3, at 451, 458.
24. Professor Costonis explains the demolition of precious landmarks in
market terms:
The demise of so many cherished buildings is a peculiarly American phe-
nomenon. In part it reflects the national penchant for identifying change
with progress won at the cost of destroying the nation's links with its past.
[Vol. 9:131
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ably favoring the economic interests of city landowners. Effective
regulation of downtown development through zoning controls would
have conflicted with the landowner's traditionally recognized interest in
maximizing the profitable development of his land.25 Thus center-
city landowners built higher and bigger.6 Moreover, it was in the
city's self-interest to allow such development. Buildings of vast bulk
increase the city's prestige. 7 and the opportunities for office employ-
ment in an increasingly white-collar world, as well as providing in-
creased sources of property tax revenue.
The failure of traditional zoning to effectively control intensive
development in the central business districts has become starkly evi-
dent in the last decade2 s Zoning provided no means of preserving
amenities.:- Older, more gracious structures were demolished to make
way for functional buildings designed to utilize completely all avail-
able space-a response necessary to counter the staggering costs of
land, construction, financing and property taxes.30 In short, "the
More fundamentally, however, it is the product of a system that vests the
initiative for most urban development decisions in private property owners,
whose choices, predictably enough, are shaped by the necessities of the real
estate market.
Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and Preservation of Urban Land-
marks, 85 HAtav. L. REv. 574-75 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Chicago Plan].
25. "There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages
the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the
sorld, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe."
2 IV. BLAC5sTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
26. Our cities have grown so fast and land prices increased so rapidly that
fairly new buildings are often destroyed to exploit the land more intensively.
SPACE AORIFT, supra note 7, at 7-9, quoting Nelson, Appraisal of Air Rights, 23
APPRAISAL J. 495 (1955).
27. See Superville, supra note 3, at 465.
28. See Comment, Bonus or Incentive Zoning-Legal Implications, 21 SYRA-
cus L. REv. 895 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bonus or Incentive Zoning].
For example, "the failure of land use control law can be seen . . . in the
sterile, monolithic office buildings in which hundreds of people work and through
which hundreds more pass daily and in which no provisions have been made
for parking spaces, food service, public rest rooms, public telephones, or simply
a place to sit down." Id. See also SPACE AnRIrT, supra note 7, at 86.
29. "Amenity, says Sir William Helford, includes 'a whole catalogue of values.'
It includes the beauty that an artist sees and an architect designs for; it is the
pleasant and familiar scene that history has evolved; in certain circumstances
it is even utility-the right thing in the right place." Tyrwhitt, Book Review,
24 J. Ass. INST. PLANNERS 61 (1963).
30. See Carmicheal, Transferable Development Rights as a Basis for Land Use
Control, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 35, 39 (1974).
1975]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
towering domiciles of . . . office operations are massive traffic genera-
tors and sidewalk killers. An evening stroll past a block-long blank
facade quickens the pace but not the pulse."'3
This Note examines development rights transfer, a concept that has
recently emerged in response to the problem of preserving urban
amenities. 32 Development rights transfer promises to end traditional
zoning's inability to preserve landmarks and provide open space. The
two present principal transfer systems, the plan now in effect in New
York and the proposed Chicago Plan, are designed to preserve urban
landmarks, perhaps the most immediately endangered species of urban
amenity. Conventional methods for withdrawing historical landmarks
and open space from the land development market are surveyed for
two reasons. First, the inadequacies of present methods to preserve
historic landmarks, and the open space amenity they frequently pro-
vide, accent the peculiar adaptability of development rights transfer
to that problem. Secondly, it is submitted that, as a product of the
evolutionary process by which American cities have attempted to
adapt to their own growth, development rights transfer represents a
logical extension of current practices. Because of its profound impli-
cations for present property and zoning concepts, development rights
transfer illustrates the continuing impact of the creative ferment that
Turner predicted would occur in the nation's second frontier-the
cities. 3
I. TiiE QUEST FOR URBAN AMENITY THROUGH INCENTIVE ZONING
To combat the spreading desolation of urban centers and return
to them some semblance of the human scale, cities have intervened in
downtown economics to encourage development decisions that market
31. McCue, Chicago Ponders a People Plan, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June
16, 1974, at 50, col. 2. See also Carmicheal, supra note 30.
32. Although this Note is confined to development rights transfer as a method
for landmark preservation, the concept is a highly adaptable tool for preservation
of open space and other endangered resources as well. See generally SPACE ADruT,
supra note 7, at 173-75; Carmicheal, supra note 30; Costonis, Development Rights
Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75, 91-95 (1973); City & County
of Honolulu, Bill No. 101 (1974) (on file with the Urban Law Annual); The
Open Space Preservation Act, Fourth Draft, May 2, 1973 (a comprehensive
development rights transfer system for preservation of farmland, woodland and
open ,space in densely populated New Jersey prepared by B. Budd Chavooshian,
Land Use Specialist and Program Advisor for Resource Management at Rutgers
University and slated for introduction before the New Jersey Senate and General
Assembly).
33. See text at note 6 supra.
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realities would not otherwise permit.34 The methods devised to ac-
complish this end are collectively called "incentive zoning."35 "In-
centive zoning is a plan whereby, in return for including certain
features or amenities in his building, a developer is allowed to de-
sign his building in a manner not otherwise permitted by the zoning
ordinance."36 The most familiar example of incentive zoning is the
zoning bonus, which permits a developer to increase density in re-
turn for specified amenities. The value of the bonus equals or slightly
exceeds the cost to the developer of providing the amenity.37 The
potential distortion of the city's zoning plan caused by the bonus
34. SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 30; Bonus or Incentive Zoning, supra
note 28, at 895.
35. Incentive zoning includes bonus zoning, air rights transfer, and develop-
ment rights transfer. Although closely related, and thus often confused, the latter
two are distinguishable: "[Air rights] are a property interest in a three-dimen-
sional location in space. Development rights, on the other hand, are simply a
governmental license to build a defined amount of floor area as measured by
the amount of lot area that has been constructively 'transferred' to the project
site." Chicago Plan, supra note 24, at 592 n.5 8. For a discussion of air rights
transfers in connection with the New York transfer system see text at note 55
infra. For a review of incentive zoning techniques see Freilich, Development
Timing, Moratoria, and Controlling Growth, in INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZON-
ING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 147, 183-91 (1974).
36. Bonus or Incentive Zoning, supra note 28, at 896 (emphasis added).
Although such programs differ widely, they are all based on a trade between
the city and the developer. In exchange for a relaxation of the city's bulk
zoning restrictions, the developer must either provide a public amenity or make
a cash payment to finance the city's purchase of a public improvement. Chicago
Plan, supra note 24, at 576.
37. SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 30. Such amenities may include plazas,
arcades or subway concourses. Id. San Francisco has established a special district
in the do-wntown area in which a builder receives a larger floor area ratio upon
donation of an amenity. A donated amenity would include access to rapid
transit, proximity to a rapid transit station, parking, multiple building entrances,
sidewalk widening, a mid-block walkway from one street to another, a public
plaza, building tower setback, or an observation deck atop the building. Maximum
use of such bonuses can more than double the allowable floor area ratio, but
the usual increase is much smaller. Bonus or Incentive Zoning, supra note 28, at
896.
New York has not adopted a single comprehensive downtown incentive zoning
plan, opting instead to use specific incentive plans that apply to relatively small
geographical areas. One such plan has been devised for the theater district. To
prevent more lucrative office building development from displacing the theaters,
developers who incorporate legitimate theaters in their buildings are permitted
as much as a 20% increase in floor area ratio. The presence of other amex.ities,
such as restaurants, is also taken into consideration in awarding the bonuses. Id.
at 896-97.
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system is rationalized on the theory that additional open space amenity
at the street level allows the city to "digest" additional vertical den-
sity.38 In fact, evidence exists that the proliferation of generous
zoning bonuses has compounded the problems of congestion and
excess bulk that they were intended to remedy without providing a
useful amenity in return.39 The Chicago zoning bonus scheme is
illustrative of the extremes to which zoning bonuses can be carried:
The bonuses . . . permit the owner of a full-block site, for ex-
ample, to construct a 140-story building containing six million
square feet of floor area, almost three times the space found in
New York's 102-story Empire State building. So generous are
the bonuses, in fact, that projects on sites of a half-block or more,
such as the 1l0-story Sears building . . . do not exhaust their
permitted zoning envelopes. The flight path regulations of the
Civil Aeronautics Board . . . fix the height and bulk of such
projects, not Chicago's zoning.4
Because cities are resigned to virtually unrestricted development of
the revenue-generating central business districts,-' the zoning bonus
system, originally conceived to extract some concession from builders
in the form of amenity, has become notorious. One New York de-
veloper exclaimed: "There's no such thing as zoning, there's only
deals." 42
38. SPAcE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 31. The same rationale does not apply
to non-open space amenities such as theaters, since such amenities actually in-
crease congestion. For a discussion of the legal implications of this inconsistency
see Bonus or Incentive Zoning, supra note 28, at 898.
39. "[T]he Loop has gone somewhat plaza-happy. Chicago's zoning bonus . . .
has caused buildings to grow tall and plazas to sprawl. Chicago seems to keep
asking itself to believe that it is a city of perpetual spring, when actually its
summers are shriveling and its winters ferocious. In the spring and fall it rains
quite a lot . . . ." McCue, Chicago Ponders a People Plan, supra note 31, at
5C, col. 5.
40. Costonis, Formula Found to Preserve the Past, 38 PLANNINO 307, 308
(1972) (emphasis added). For a comprehensive review of the operation of
Chicago's zoning bonus system see SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 83-88.
41. Chicago's comprehensive plan frankly acknowledges this dependence:
The central business district is unique in the system of business areas for more
than its size. It is Chicago's most important single asset. The combination
of major stores, cultural institutions, commercial recreation activities, and
a diversity of offices in a compact area provides a special attraction to
additional developments which otherwise might not locate in the Chicago
area. The city will strengthen the Central Business District by programs
and policies that will retain its present compact form, improve its accessi-
bility, and facilitate movement within the district.
Superville, supra note 3, at 497 (quoting from the Chicago comprehensive plan).
42. Id.
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The desperate plight of the urban historic landmark can be under-
stood only when approached within the zoning context outlined
above. Because the typical landmark building makes only partial
use of the floor area allotted to its site, it often cannot compete for
survival in an overheated real estate market.43 Intense development
pressure means higher land values that present an irresistible economic
temptation to owners of small parcels.44 Because zoning bonuses can
be efficiently exploited only on large parcels,45 developers hasten to
assemble a number of smaller parcels to realize the greatest possible
advantage from the system. The result, given existing market con-
ditions, is inevitable: demolition of what remains of our architec-
tural heritage"; to make room for functionally efficient, uniformly
drab monoliths. The irony of bonus zoning is that, in attempting to
provide one type of amenity, the system actually encourages the
destruction of another, the urban landmark.47  One commentator
observes: "Incentive zoning is America's new City Beautiful move-
ment. The governing image supplied once by the Columbian Ex-
position's collaboration is now supplied in the built form of the slab-
the American puritanical. It is the Chicago School's pre-1893 utili-
tarian style raised to the status of a classic." 4 Thus the Chicago
School's architectural revolution has come full circle; it has become
the old order, to be displaced by its own progeny.49
43. Landmark buildings may also be physically obsolete as a result of poor
maintenance and functionally obsolete because they incorporate outmoded de-
sign techniques and mechanical systems. SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 10.
44. Id. at 10, 87.
45. Id. at 84. The basic floor area ratio permitted by the zoning ordinance
can be increased by the multiple permitted times the area of open space amenity
provided at ground level. Thus, a developer with a 50,000 square foot site zoned
to a floor area ratio of 10 can, by providing a plaza of 25,000 square feet, add
250,000 square feet of floor area to the 500,000 square feet permitted as of right,
thereby obtaining a 50% increase in floor area. Id. at 83.
46. A substantial portion of the buildings listed in the Historic American
Buildings Survey carried out by the federal government in 1933 have been
demolished. See SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 4 ("over a third of the 16,000
structures listed") ; Chicago Plan, supra note 24, at 574 ("over fifty percent of the
12,000 buildings listed"); Costonis, supra note 40, at 307 ("[m]ore than half of
the 12,000 buildings listed"). Included in the toll are numerous treasures of
the Chicago School. See SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 11.
47. SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 10.
48. Superville, supra note 3, at 460-61.
49. This displacement comports with Turner's thesis; the city is America's
second frontier:
American social development has been continually beginning over again on
1975]
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II. THE URBAN LANDMARK'S PLIGHT UNDER EXISTING LEGISLATION
De Tocqueville remarked that "[d]emocratic nations . . . cultivate
the arts that serve to render life easy in preference to those whose
object is to adorn it. They will habitually prefer the useful to the
beautiful, and they will require that the beautiful should be useful."G0
This pithy observation explains why architectural landmarks are an
endangered species. Nevertheless, with the increasing concern for
their natural and human environment, 5 ' Americans are beginning
to understand that utility may be realized in both material and spirit-
ual terms. This new awareness has stimulated efforts to preserve the
nation's historical and cultural heritage.52
Conventional landmark preservation provisions often fail in their
goal, however, because they seek to impose the costs of preservation
upon the landmark owner or upon the city. Professor John J.
Costonis, co-author of the Chicago Plan, analyzes their failure as
stemming from the typical preservation scheme's division of the
preservation cycle into two stages.53 First, the municipal government,
acting under the police power, designates the building a landmark
and requires its owner to submit any alteration or demolition plans
to the landmarks commission for approval. If a landmark owner
submits such a plan and the commission rejects it, the commission
has a grace period during which it may seek a compromise with the
landmark owner. If no compromise can be reached, the preservation
cycle moves to its second stage. The commission recommends that
the legislative body proceed to acquire or condemn the building. The
the frontier...
As successive terminal moraines result from successive glaciations, so each
frontier leaves its traces behind it. .. .And to study this advance
and the political, economic, and social results of it, is to study the really
American part of our history.
TURNER, supra note 2, at 2-4.
50. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEmIocRAcy IN AMiERICA 48 (H. Reeve transl., P.
Bradley ed. 1960).
51. See SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 167.
52. Id. at 3. Although hundreds of municipal, state and federal preservation
laws have been adopted, they are typically inadequate. Nevertheless, they suggest
that strong sentiment exists to counter the "potent opposition of special-interest
groups who have little sympathy for preservation." Id. For a review of federal,
state and local efforts, and related problems see 36 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 311-
444 (1971). SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 19-27, also contains a concise survey
of the legislative response to the challenge of historic preservation with citations
to the literature in the field.
53. See SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 27; Chicago Plan, supra note 24, at
580-84.
[Vol. 9:131
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol9/iss1/6
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS TRANSFER
entire cost of preservation is thus shifted from the landowner to the
public. 5 Yet the financially pressed municipality is usually unable,
and therefore unwilling, to bear the costs of acquiring and main-
taining the landmark, thus leaving the owner free to demolish or
alter the building. As a result, despite the limited effectiveness of
private preservation efforts,55 landmarks continue to disappear at an
alarming rate.56 Existing landmarks legislation provides merely a
"plaque on the door"57 because it does not realistically address the
problem of who should pay for historic preservation.58
54. This analysis is somewhat simplified. For a more detailed discussion of
variant solutions that take account of the degree of economic hardship imposed
upon the landmark owner, thus allowing the commission to persist in its denial
of permission to alter or demolish the building in certain cases see Chicago Plan,
supra note 24, at 581 nn.29 & 30.
55. The credit for most preservation in the United States goes to the private
sector, not the government. SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 3.
56. See Id. at 10, 87.
57. New York City's landmark preservation program is a notable exception
to the general ineffectiveness of such programs. Of the 285 structures in New
York that had been formally designated landmarks by mid-1969, only one, the
Jerome Mansion, could not be saved from demolition. Development Rights
Transfer, supra note 8, at 351; see Gilbert, Saving Landmarks-The Transfer
of Development Rights, 22 HISToRIC PRESERVATION, No. 3 at 13, 14 (1970)
(noting that over 325 individual landmarks and 5000 buildings in historic
districts are under the Planning Commission's jurisdiction). The program has
succeeded without resort to the tax relief incentives available under the New
York preservation laws. Development Rights Transfer, supra note 8, at 351. The
program's success is due to the power given to the Landmark Preservation Com-
mission to refuse permission to alter or demolish any designated landmark so
long as the owner is receiving a "fair return" from his landmark. "The statute
defines this reasonable return as a net annual return of six percent of the
assessed valuation of the building and its site." Id. at 350. This impressive
record suggests that existing approaches to landmark preservation can he modified
to cope more effectively with the threat to existing landmarks capable of achiev-
ing a modest return. This is true even when such landmarks are located in the
city's center, where development pressures are greatest, since the majority of the
285 designated landmarks are located in Manhattan. Id. at 351 n.74. The limits
of such a program are implicit in the reasonable return requirement, however,
which would leave unprotected those landmarks incapable of generating a suf-
ficient return. The power to grant property tax relief to such buildings would
doubtless bring many of them within such a program, but cities are reluctant
to reduce their own revenues by affording such tax reductions. See SPACE ADRIFT,
supra note 7, at 23. Moreover, real estate interests and landmark owners who
oppose initial designation represent a potent political force that municipal ad-
ministrations are reluctant to confront. Id. at 11; see Davidson, Saving All Struc-
tures of Landmark Quality, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1974, at 29, col. 3.
58. "Legitimately concerned with the cultural significance of landmark destruc-
tion, [preservationists] have tended to skip over what is, after all, the key question
for preservation-who should pay?" SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at xv-xvi.
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III. DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS TRANSFER
A. The New York Plan
Air rights transfer, long permitted by New York's zoning law,0
suggested a possible solution to the landmarks dilemma. The tech-
nique permitted the transfer of unused air rights between contiguous
building sites held in common ownership.60 Instead of demolishing
the landmark to realize the increased value of its site, the owner of a
landmark building could simply transfer his unused rights to an ad-
jacent site.61 The landmark was only indirectly protected, however,
since the owner remained free to demolish it and erect a new build-
ing so long as the new building did not exceed the allowable floor
area remaining on the site.62 In addition, the technique was inflexible
because of the contiguous ownership requirement.03
To remedy these deficiencies and encourage landmark preservation,
New York amended its Zoning Resolution in 1968 to permit transfers
to lots across a street or intersection from the landmark. 6' Finally,
the Planning Commission was directed to condition approval of the
transfer upon finding that it "will not unduly increase the bulk of
any new development, density of population or intensity of use in
any block," and that a "program for continuing maintenance will re-
sult in the preservation of the landmark.60 In 1969 the Zoning Res-
59. Marcus, Air Rights Transfers in New York City, 36 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 372, 373 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Air Rights Transfers]. The technique
has been available since the passage of New York's 1961 Zoning Resolution.
See Development Rights Transfer, supra note 8, at 351.
60. Air Rights Transfers, supra note 59, at 373. The common ownership re-
quirement could be circumvented by obtaining a lease on an adjacent underde-
veloped parcel of sufficient duration to constitute ownership within the meaning
of the 1961 Zoning Resolution. See Development Rights Transfer, supra note
8, at 348.
61. See Gilbert, supra note 57, at 13.
62. See Chicago Plan, supra note 24, at 588 n.50.
63. Additional obstacles confronted the landmark owner: "[The contiguous
ownership requirement] meant that no merger would be possible where (1) all
the sites contiguous to a landmark were already fully developed, (2) the neigh-
boring buildings were themselves landmarks, or (3) the planners had elected
to preserve a state of 'underdevelopment' in the immediate vicinity of the land-
mark . . . " Development Rights Transfer, supra note 8, at 351.
64. Id. The "zoning lot" includes the project site plus any other contiguous
parcel located within the same city block owned by the developer. Id. at 348 n.57.
65. Id. at 352, quoting NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONiNG REs. art VII, ch. 4, §§ 74-
79 (1971).
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olution was further amended to permit transfers across more than
one street. This was accomplished by defining adjacent sites to in-
clude "a lot ...which is across a street and opposite to another lot
or lots which except for the intervention of streets or street intersec-
tions form a series extending to the lot occupied by the landmark
building. All such lots shall be in the same ownership.""
As amended, the New York Zoning Resolution provides for a limited
form of true development rights transfer.1 No one has yet taken ad-
vantage of the opportunity to transfer development rights under the
plan, 1 however, and several features of the scheme will probably
limit its future use in the landmark preservation context.69 Nonethe-
less, the New York development rights transfer plan implicitly rec-
ognizes the premises upon which such a program must rest, premises
at variance with traditional Anglo-American property concepts.
66. Development Rights Transfer, supra note 8, at 356, quoting NEw YORK,
N.Y., ZONING RFS. art. VII, ch. 4, §§ 74-79 (1971).
67. See note 35 supra.
68. One developer attempted to take advantage of the 1968 amendment with
a proposal that called for the erection of two towers over Grand Central Station.
The towers would use the unused air rights of the terminal, which has a floor
area ratio of 1.5, in a district whose maximum is 18. The proposed towers were
of such enormous dimensions that the Planning Commission dismissed it as an
"aesthetic joke." SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 37.
The 1969 amendment was announced the same day that the developer filed
suit against the city. The amendment would allow Grand Central's excess de-
velopment rights to be distributed among the extensive Penn Central holdings
around the station, an area aptly known as "Grand Central City." For the
complete account see Development Rights Transfer, supra note 8, at 353-58.
For an artist's conception of the proposed development see SPACE. ADRIFT, supra
note 7, at 37.
One proposal to transfer the development rights from a 19th century series
of residences and small commercial structures built around an interior garden,
known as Amster Yard, was almost consummated but "has yet to be put into
operation due to the lull in the office building market in New York." Air Rights
Transfers, supra note 59, at 376.
69. Professor Costonis cites five principal drawbacks of the New York develop-
ment rights transfer scheme. First, the plan provides no rational incentive structure
to induce owners to preserve their landmarks; by limiting development rights
transfer to adjacent lots, the program imposes severe restraints upon the potential
market for these rights. The plan is useful only when a developer owns a lot
located across a street or an intersection from a landmark owner or owns a series
of lots that connect with the landmark lot. Chicago Plan, supra note 24, at 586-
87. Secondly, the maze of discretionary approval procedures and vague aesthetic
criteria do not encourage landmark owner participation. Also, transfer permits
are issued only after formal designation, thus putting many landmark-quality
buildings beyond the reach of the program. Id. at 587. Thirdly, the plan relies
on voluntary owner participation. Id. at 588. Fourthly, no adequate assurances
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B. The Chicago Plan
Traditional property law views one's rights in land as dependent
upon the particular "estate" or ownership interest that one holds in
it. Subject only to the limitations inherent in his estate and the
rights of his neighbors, the owner of land is free to do with it as he
will.7o Zoning, to the extent that it modifies the property owner's free-
dom, clearly conflicts with the concept of private property. In fact, the
development potential of urban land is derived less from rights in-
herent in ownership than from the zoning rules imposed by govern-
ment.71 The notion that truly private property can exist in a down-
town area becomes anomalous when one considers that the value of
downtown land is largely a product of public investment 1 2 A re-
evaluation of seven centuries of property law7 3 demonstrates that
exist that the landmark will be adequately preserved. Id. (This criticism does not
appear altogether warranted. See text at notes 61-62 supra and the description of
the unique trust fund and voluntary preservation agreement worked out for Amster
Yard described in Air Rights Transfers, supra note 59, at 376.) Lastly, the
adjacency requirement produces unsound urban design consequences tending to
concentrate bulk within the limited transfer area, thus leading to congestion and
the dwarfing of the landmark itself. Chicago Plan, supra note 24, at 589. This
weakness also helps justify the plan, however, since the adjacency requirement
also permits the use of a "digestion" rationale to justify the program. See text
at note 38 supra.
With regard to Professor Costonis' first objection to the New York plan, that
it only allows transfers between contiguous lots, one commentator criticizes his
reading of the statute: "Costonis seems to have missed the point that transfer
over a greatly enlarged area-the keystone of his own Chicago Plan-was pos-
sible in New York more than two years before his own rights transfer proposal."
Development Rights Transfer, supra note 8, at 356 n. 1 03 (emphasis added).
The author fails to acknowledge, however, that transfer over a "greatly enlarged
area" is only possible in the unique circumstances of the "Grand Central City"
situation because of the statute's requirement that all intervening lots be in
common ownership. See id. at 353-56. The extent to which transfer over a
greatly enlarged area is possible under the New York scheme is hardly comparable
to that permitted under the Chicago Plan because of New York City's common
ownership requirement.
70. "Land hath also in its legal signification, an indefinite extent, upwards as
well as downwards. Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum [whose is the soil,
his it is up to the sky], is the maxim of the law ... " 2 W. BLACICSTONr,
COMMENTARIES *18. See also note 25 supra.
71. See SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 34.
72. The value of downtown parcels is largely a product of government invest-
ment in subways, streets, sanitation, police forces, and various other municipal
services and facilities. Id.
73. For a summary of the evolution of the law of property takings and regula-
tion see F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAxING Issun 51-138
(1973).
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[u]rban space should no longer be regarded simply as "private"
property, to be used as the developer's own sweet will dictates.
Rather, it has become in part a public asset which cities may
properly allocate through incentive zoning to achieve community
goals that have consistently been frustrated under outdated but
deeply engrained property and land use concepts.7 4
Heretofore, the development potential of a parcel of land could be
used only on that parcel. Given the notion that the excess develop-
ment potential of one parcel can be transferred to adjacent parcels
under different ownership, as New York City has done,75 the next
logical step is to sever such rights altogether and "cast them adrift,"
to be distributed over the cityscape as the needs of both the com-
munity and the market dictate. This is the goal envisioned by the
Chicago Plan for landmarks preservation.7-
The Chicago Plan would be implemented by initially designating
a "development rights transfer district" embracing the area or areas
where downtown landmarks are concentrated.7 Landmark designation
74. SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 35 (emphasis added). While The Taking
Issue, supra note 73, interprets the public interest in certain private property as a
license to severely restrict that property's value through stringent regulation, Profes-
sor Costonis relies on it to justify severing that value and transferring it elsewhere,
compensating the owner for his loss.
75. See text at notes 59-69 supra.
76. The Chicago "Plan" is actually a cluster of variations on the general plan
outlined in the text. To avoid confusion, any comments directed to these varia-
tions will be identified. The outline of the Chicago Plan and the premises upon
which it is based is adapted from SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 28-64, and
from Chicago Plan, supra note 24, at 589-634. The reader should consult those
sources for a more complete discussion. For additional, more general references
see Costonis, The Costs of Preservation, 140 ARCHrrECTURAL FonumI 61 (Jan. 1974);
Costonis, Whichever Way You Slice It, DRT Is Here To Stay, 40 PLANNING 10
(July 1974); Costonis, supra note 32; Costonis, supra note 40, Legner, Putting
Landmarks on a Firmer Footing, 140 ARCHITECTURAL FORUm 56 (July 1974);
Morris, "Zoning Imagination"--Dimensional Zoning, 46 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 679
(1972); Pedowitz, Transfer of Air Rights and Development Rights, 9 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 183 (1974); Shlaes, The Economics of Development Rights Trans-fers, 42 APPRAISAL J. 526 (1974) ; Shlaes, Who Pays for Transfer of Development
Rights?, 40 PLANNING 7 (July 1974).
77. See SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 40; Chicago Plan, supra note 24, at
590. A variation of the plan calls for designation of a transfer district or districts
outside the landmarks area. See SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 50-52. This
variation would allow transfer of development rights when further density within
the landmark district is not desirable due to either the inadequacy of existing
public facilities or the special character of the area. Id. Because an independent
transfer district's zoning would have to be adjusted deliberately downward to
bolster the market for development rights, this alternative poses substantial due
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would entitle the owner to transfer his excess development rights to
other lots within the transfer district and to receive a property tax
reduction proportionate to the decrease in the landmark site's value.7
process and fiscal zoning questions. For Professor Costonis' responses to these
anticipated arguments see id. at 161-66; Chicago Plan, supra note 24, at 620-32.
Two problems with independent districting merit consideration. The first would
arise when all the available development rights had been sold or when the
maximum amount allotted to a given independent transfer district had been
exhausted. Professor Krasnowiecki points out that "there (is] a sense running
through standard zoning that you cannot establish regulations for an area that
would allow one landowner to deprive the other of a pro-rata share of permis-
sible development." Krasnowiecki, Legal Aspects of Planned Unit Development
in Theory and in Practice, in FRONTIERS OF PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT 99,
104 (R. Burchell ed. 1973). In DeMaria v. Enfield Planning & Zoning Comm'n,
159 Conn. 534, 271 A.2d 105 (1970), however, the town had limited to 375
the number of apartment units that could be constructed in certain residential
districts. Three developers submitted applications for units totalling 486 and the
town denied a permit to the second developer on aesthetic grounds. On appeal
the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the aesthetic reasons given by the
town for denial of the second developer's application were insufficient and ordered
his application approved. The court went on to point out that its decision an-
nulled the third developer's approval. "As a consequence, the action of the com-
mission in allotting 112 apartment unit[s] . . . [to the third developer] cannot
be sustained, in view of the regulation which limits the apartment units in
that neighborhood to a total of 375." Id. at 543, 271 A.2d at 109 (emphasis
added). The DeMaria court did not consider whether such a quota was itself
sustainable. Nevertheless, the court's implicit assumption that the quota was
valid suggests that an analogous limit on the amount of development rights
available in the transfer district might be acceptable to the courts. In Oakwood
at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353
(L. Div. 1971), on the other hand, the township conceded the invalidity of an
ordinance provision allowing the construction of only 200 multi-family units
annually. Id. at 17, 283 A.2d at 356.
The second problem posed by independent districting involves the potential
for urban design distortion in designating a transfer district within which zoning
is adjusted downwards and developers are required to buy additional develop-
ment rights. Although Professor Costonis concedes that the practicability of
this approach hinges upon the presence of a lively market within the transfer
district for such rights, he does not explain why a developer would not seek
to build as near the transfer district as possible under more generous zoning
(or using standard amendment procedures) and thereby avoid purchasing
development rights within the transfer district. Although the unwitting disloca-
tion of the natural patterns of development that prompted selection of the
transfer district in the first place might concededly be avoided by strict controls
on development outside the transfer district, to date zoning has not been so
precisely administered. Moreover, power to avoid channeling development away
from the transfer district ends at the municipality's jurisdictional lines. It might
be that the costs of supporting landmark preservation would tip the balance
in a developer's locational decision-making, thus aggravating the flight from the
cities.
78. SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 40.
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In return for these benefits the landmark owner would be required
to convey a "preservation restriction" to the city forbidding redevelop-
ment of the site and obligating present and future owners to maintain
the building properly.79 Finally, to prevent design abuses at the
transferee sites, ceilings would be placed on the amount of gross bulk
increases that would be allowed.-0
An interesting component of the Chicago Plan is the strong arm
feature that would allow the city to acquire a preservation restriction
through condemnation should the landmark owner reject the transfer-
tax incentive package.sl While the condemnation feature eliminates
the need for the voluntary cooperation by the landmark owner that
renders the New York programs2 ineffective, it also introduces a com-
plicated administrative element into the Plan, the "development
rights bank."' ' 3
79. The elements of preservation restrictions should include: (1) the legal
authority upon which its acquisition is based; (2) restrictions on use, demolition
or material alteration; (3) restoration requirements, if any, and maintenance
obligations; (4) remedies; and (5) duration. Id. at 44. Professor Costonis
mentions three principal objections to the restrictions. First, the injustice to
the landowner of taking a less-than-fee interest in the property, thus leaving him
with all the responsibilities and few of the privileges of ownership. Secondly,
the novelty of the preservation restriction makes it uncertain whether authority,
either common law or statutory, exists for the condemnation of such interests.
Lastly, whether the rights acquired by the city under the preservation restriction
would be sufficiently defined to be capable of enforcement and whether they
would be enforceable against subsequent owners. Id. at 44, 45, 48, 150-57;
Chicago Plan, supra note 24, at 611-20.
A serious problem arises when the building is so unsound that maintenance
requirements are unreasonably onerous, or when the building owner refuses to co-
operate in a program of maintenance subsidy funded by the development rights
bank, or to purchase outright in fee. SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 42, 44.
Both of these options present difficulties of their own. See note 84 infra. The
Chicago Plan relies heavily on the package of property and income tax incen-
tives, combined with the compensation provided from the proceeds of the
development rights transfer, to ensure owner cooperation. See SPACE ADRIFT,
supra note 7, at 42-44; Chicago Plan, supra note 24, at 591-93. Professor
Costonis presents persuasive arguments that landmarks under adaptive re-use will
be economically viable, even attractive, for investors. See SPACE ADRIFT, supra
note 7, at 65-79. The question remains, however, whether a building owner will
cooperate in a maintenance program. See forton, Preservation Features: Demo-
lition by Neglect, 22 HISTORIC PRESERVATION, no. 4, at 2 (1970): "Except for
natural disasters, . . . the destruction of America's heritage is basically man-
made, by both overt and covert acts." Id. (emphasis added).
80. SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 40.
81. Id.
82. See Chicago Plan, supra note 24, at 588.
83. SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 52, 105.
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The development rights bank is necessary to fund acquisition costs
and program administration expenses, 84 and would in turn be funded
by the sale to developers of development rights acquired by it from
three sources: development rights acquired by purchase or condemna-
tion of privately owned landmarks; development rights transferred
from municipally owned landmarks; and donations of development
rights by owners of landmarks in private hands.85 The latter two
sources are essential to the success of the bank. They would provide
the cushion necessary to absorb the program's administrative costs
and any deficit that might result from the sale of rights condemned or
acquired from the privately owned landmarks.8,
The creation of a development rights bank would thus ease the
"police power-eminent domain deadlock" 8 that presently frustrates
landmark preservation efforts. The bank concept imposes the cost of
84. Id. at 40, 52-54. Such expenses would include the cost of appraisal of de-
velopment rights, administering the development rights bank and transfers, preser-
vation restriction supervision and enforcement over an indefinite time span, and, in
some cases, ongoing subsidies for those landmarks unable to operate at a fair re-
turn even given the reduced property taxes included in the incentive package.
Id. at 54, 105-06.
In his discussion of the economic aspects of the plan Professor Costonis
inadequately addresses the potential drain on the bank's resources posed by such
subsidies extending over indefinite periods of time. He asserts that "[fjor the
foreseeable future, it is reasonable to expect that landmarks will remain competi-
tive in the marketplace," basing that supposition on a study of four Chicago
landmarks. Id. at 78. Yet only two of these buildings operated economically.
Professor Costonis' solution for the unprofitable buildings is for their owners to
"spend some of the funds provided by the property tax reduction for renovation,
thereby increasing their buildings' appeal to potential tenants and increasing
existing occupancy levels." Id. In light of the decreased marketability of the
landmarks caused by the annihilation of all speculative value in them, and
considering that "[tjhe profit-motivated investor will look elsewhere," there
appears room for serious doubt that the plan could save landmarks other than
those that are already capable of generating adeauate returns on investment.
Id. Thus, absent subsidies to ensure the landmark's physical survival, the Plan
would have to fall back on the very options it was designed to avoid: acquisi-
tion in fee by the municipality or reliance on private preservation efforts. Yet
Professor Costonis proposes acquisition of such marginal buildings in "exceptional
cases." See id. at 44, 79.
85. Id. at 52. Professor Costonis has designed an incentive package to induce
private donors to contribute development rights to the bank. In addition to real
estate tax relief, such a donation would entitle the donor to a charitable income
tax deduction. See Chicago Plan, supra note 24, at 593 nn.65 & 66. See also
SPACE ADRzFT, supra note 7, at 191-93 (app. III).
86. SPACE ADRIrT, supra note 7, at 52.
87. See text at notes 53-56 supra.
[Vol. 9:131
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol9/iss1/6
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS TRANSFER
acquiring preservation restrictions from landmark owners upon de-
velopers who purchase the development rights. Thus the bank shifts
the cost of preservation from the private sector to the market sector
responsible for the development pressure that endangers urban land-
marks. In addition, the bank provides the means to compensate the
landmark owner for economic losses resulting from landmark designa-
tion and the extinction of his speculative development rights.88 The
Plan thus allows the public to recover some of the increment in value
added to downtown property by public investment, in the form of
landmark preservation and maintenance, while at the same time pre-
venting the wipeouts that ordinarily befall the landmark owner under
88. Under one alternative version of the Plan a heavily-capitalized develop-
ment rights bank would not be required. Instead, the commission would
prepare and periodically update an index of the value of a stated increment
of development rights for all parcels within the development rights transfer
district. With each sale of development rights by the landmark owner, a sum
representing their total dollar equivalent will be -debited on the basis of the
figure indicated for the site to which the rights are actually transferred.
SPACL ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 42 (emphasis added). Thus as a landmark
owner sold off his development rights his "account" would be debited in an
amount equalling the dollar value of the rights sold determined in relation to
their value at the transferee site. Apart from the enormous administrative burden
and the attendant costs of preparing and periodically updating an index of the
value of the development rights for all parcels within the development rights
transfer district, query whether this alternative might pose just compensation
objections when the landmark owner's rights have been condemned. Not only
would the compensation not be immediately forthcoming, but it would be in
the form of development rights for which a market may or may not exist. "While
the constitutions of the states do not ordinarily prescribe the medium by which
compensation shall be paid, that the compensation must be in money is a qualifi-
cation that has been read into the [just compensation clause] by all the courts
in which the question has arisen." 3 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMTAIN
§ 8.2 (J. Sackman ed. 1974).
Another problem, equally disturbing, is one that Professor Costonis does not
address. As he acknowledges, "[tlhe value of the landmark's development rights
may be greater or lesser at the landmark site than at the transferee site or sites."
SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 42. If this is the case, it is difficult to see how
a landmark owner could be fully compensated by the sale of the landmark's
development rights when the rights are worth less at the transferee site than at
the landmark site. The only way to provide full compensation in that case
would be to authorize sale of more rights than were acquired, hoping that on
the average the value of all rights sold would equal the value of all those
acquired. Should this assumption prove false, it would cut to the heart of the
plan's asserted advantage over bonus zoning, that rather than creating density
ex nihilo, it merely redistributes density already authorized under existing zoning.
Compare id. supra note 7, at 34, with id. at 48, 49, 50, 128.
For a discussion of a related problem with private trading in a development
rights market see note 105 infra.
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preservation programs carried out solely under the police power. In
addition, a carefully conceived program of development rights trans-
fer "provides a tool that the city can use to channel density selectively
to predetermined locations .... "8,s
Despite its numerous advantages,90 the Plan presents some signifi-
cant difficulties. An obvious objection is that, by permitting land-
owners to purchase additional density, the Plan undercuts the validity
of the zoning code's density requirements.- Professor Costonis re-
sponds to this argument by analogizing development rights transfer
to density zoning techniques 92 such as cluster development 1 and
planned unit development,9 ' which permit greater density than exist-
ing zoning allows. He posits that the objection proceeds from two
faulty assumptions; that each zoning lot has a single proper bulk level
and that density must be distributed on a lot by lot basis:91
89. SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 136.
90. See text at notes 77-89 supra.
91. Such increases appear to negate the reasonableness of either the zoning
code's density requirements or the increases themselves. If the density limits
are sound, relaxing them would invite congestion, facility and service overloads,
and buildings out of scale with their neighbors. If, on the other hand, the code's
density limits are too strict, the allowances should be uniformly liberalized through-
out the transfer district. To selectively relax existing density limits "creates the
impression of sacrificing sensible planning at the altar of fiscal opportunism."
SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 130.
92. Density zoning discards the notion that density must be apportioned on
a lot-by-lot basis. Instead, a maximum amount of density is prescribed for an
area as a whole, giving developers the option of concentrating or dispersing the
bulk in accordance with flexible design criteria set forth in the ordinance. See
id. at 128.
93. Cluster zoning permits the developer to trade an amenity dedicated to
community use, such as a park or schoolground, for the right to build the same
number of units he could have built on the entire tract. Id. See generally R.
BURCHELL, PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMiENT-NEw COMMfUNITIES AmERICAN STYLE
(1972); Elliot & Marcus, From Euclid to Ramapo: New Directions in Land
Development Controls, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 56, 72, 85 (1973) (discussing both
planned unit development and development rights transfer); Sternlieb, Burchell &
Hughes, Planned Unit Development: Environmental Suboptimization, 1 ENVnRON-
MENTAL AFFAIRS 694 (1972); Report of Subcomm. of Comm. on Public Regula-
tion of Land Use, Planned Unit Developments and Floating Zones, 7 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 61 (1972).
94. Planned unit development ordinances permit modifications in lot size within
the project area, and they relax building type and use restrictions. SPACr ADRIFT,
supra note 7, at 128.
95. Id. at 127, 132.
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The truth of the matter is that these numbers are little more
than pragmatic approximations of densities that, it is hoped,
will further a variety of urban design and growth objectives.
Translating these goals into numbers partakes more of art than
science. 96
Professor Costonis concludes that sufficient flexibility exists within the
"interstices" of the basic zoning code to accommodate the bulk modi-
fications contemplated by the Plan.97 In addition, by limiting the
number of landmark designations it makes, the city can ensure that
the transfer district's capacity to absorb excess development rights
will not be exceeded.08 Professor Costonis emphasizes99 that because
it is "an instance of density zoning, the Plan does not increase the
total density authorized within the transfer district by existing zon-
ing. It merely shifts density from underutilized landmark lots to ap-
propriate transferee sites."10o While theoretically true, this rationale
overlooks the fact that the landmark's unused rights do not add to
the district's congestion and demand for services until they are actually
transferred. 101
Anticipating the argument that development rights transfer will
simply aggravate existing congestion in the center city, Professor
Costonis relies upon "the willingness [and ability] of the city to
do the kind of planning homework that is all too rare at the
municipal level today."10- A carefully designed transfer plan would
avoid design abuses by strictly limiting the amount of density trans-
ferable to a given site and by withdrawing sensitive or overdeveloped
96. Id. at 132.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 136.
99. E.g., id. at 34, 48, 49, 50, 128.
100. Id. at 136.
101. See Development Rights Transfer, supra note 8, at 339. Professor Costonis
does not advocate automatic transferability of development rights from landmarks
immediately upon designation. He prefers a two-tiered approach, withholding
transfer authorization while the landmark is capable of producing a "reasonable
return" in its landmark status. SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 58; see note 57
supra. Despite the obvious advantage of decreased transfers under this approach,
Professor Costonis concludes that "[plolitical realities in some cities would . ..
make its adoption unthinkable at the present time." SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7,
at 59.
102. SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 39.
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areas from eligibility.103 Additional reliance is placed upon a built-in
system of safeguards that would protect the Plan from administrative
abuse or incompetence. 0 4
Unfortunately, however, such a program is ripe for administrative
abuse. Because the Plan is practically self-executing once imple-
mented, there is little control over individual transfers.10 The Plan
relies upon administrative integrity to prevent design abuses. How-
ever praiseworthy uch optimism might be, there is no reason to
expect abuses to disappear under the Chicago Plan.1°0  The
possibility of administrative abuse is present in all spheres of govern-
mental activity, however, and should not be determinative in passing
on the Plan's feasibility. If a city is willing to commit itself to an
103. Id. at 137.
104. These safeguards include a requirement that a competent appraisal be
conducted to determine the amount of floor area necessary to compensate the
landmark owner and a requirement that developers purchase the floor area at
the going market rate. Appraisal and sale procedures would be open to public
and judicial scrutiny in addition to state and federal review if public funds had
assisted in preservation. Id. at 133.
An accurate appraisal of development rights presents a separate problem: "Of
necessity, we expose [ordinary] condemnees to .. . estimates when what is taken
from them is well defined. To expose them to estimates addressed to the valuation
of [developmental] interests themselves vague would be more than our constitu-
tion should be willing to support." Krasnowiecki & Strong, Compensable Regula-
tions for Open Space: A Means of Controlling Growth, 24 J. Am. INST. PLANNERS
87, 90 (1963). The uncertainty inherent in evaluating development rights might
well result in greatly inflated jury awards, as has been the English experience.
Id. at 91. A related question concerns the timing of the appraisal and the award
of compensation, namely, would the plan take account of future upzoning of
downtown areas where landmark parcels are located?
A lack of adequate appraisal' safeguards could have dire implications for the
economics of the Chicago Plan. For an explanation of Professor Costonis' formula
for determining the value of the preservation restriction see SrACE ADRIFT, Supra
note 7, at 65-80; Costonis, The Costs of Preservation, supra note 76, at 61. The
Department of the Interior was satisfied with these valuation methods, and has
approved the establishment of a National Cultural Park as a demonstration for
the Chicago Plan. The program is currently in limbo, however, because approval
was contingent upon Chicago's adoption of the plan. Indications are that Chicago
will not approve the plan. See Shlaes, Who Pays for Transfer of Development
Rights?, 40 PLANNING 7, 8 (July 1974).
105. It is conceivable that speculators might corner the private market for de-
velopment rights. Although this would undoubtedly benefit the development rights
bank, it could lead to highly inflated prices for additional development rights, and,
in effect, lead to their being sold twice.
106. This is a point that Professor Costonis candidly concedes. SPACE ADRIFT,
supra note 7, at 133.
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effective preservation scheme, there is as much reason to believe that
it would protect that objective as that it would not.
A practical objection to the Chicago Plan's feasibility is posed by
the existence of already generous zoning and bonus density allotments
permitted as of right. 07 In most cases, existing zoning is sufficient to
accommodate potential growth without the introduction of a de-
velopment rights transfer system. Since the success of the Chicago
Plan admittedly depends upon the existence of a market for the de-
velopment rights, 0s it is questionable whether the Plan could cope
with the competition of "free" and generous zoning bonuses.
The response to the market problem lies in a subtle feature of the
Plan. Because the Chicago Plan transfers not simply unbuilt floor
area but the unused development potential of the landmark site
itself, a developer would be allowed marginal increases in site cov-
erage at the transferee site. 09 The developer could thus achieve
economies not possible under the bonus zoning system, which merely
allows greater height, and may actually reduce permissible tower site
coverage by the amount of the open space amenity required in return
for the bonus.110 Thus instead of building additional floors the de-
veloper can build larger floors. Building costs soar as a building's
height and perimeter increase."1 Since larger floors permit a higher
ratio of rentable floor area to service, utility, access and other non-
rentable area, the purchase of development rights may be more at-
tractive to a developer than existing zoning bonuses that may actually
decrease building efficiency and increase building costs.1 1 '
107. See text at note 40 supra.
108. SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 94. This dependence upon a market for
development rights led one author to conclude that a development rights transfer
scheme would be unworkable as a solution to the problem of preserving Honolulu's
Chinatown. A second factor was the inability of the transfer district to absorb the
massive amounts of development rights allotted to the Chinatown area. See D.
Fine, Historic Preservation in Honolulu's Chinatown: A Preliminary Study, 111-20,
Sept. 1974 (unpublished manuscript prepared for Aotani & Hartwell Asso-
ciates, Inc., Honolulu, Hawaii, on file with the Urban Law Annual). The second
factor highlights the limited application of the Chicago Plan and the need to
bolster the market for development rights by exercising a high degree of selectivity
in designating landmarks, since the unused development rights of a relatively few
buildings would soon flood the market.
109. SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 95.
1 10. Id. at 95-97.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 95-102.
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Even assuming that an active market will exist for development
rights, the market advantage obtained by permitting greater tower
site coverage implies a trade-off in urban design. Although the in-
creased density permitted might be offset by the open space 13 and
amenity provided by the landmark, it is difficult to justify the density
increase under the digestion rationale when the landmark and the
transferee site are physically distant.114 Unless strict limitations on
such increases in site coverage are included in the transfer plan, de-
sign abuses that will aggravate the congestion and aridity of urban
core areas are certain to result.
Professor Costonis is skeptical of the notion that market forces can
produce sound private land use decisions under existing land use
regimes. 15 For a Plan that purports to displace market forces as the
arbiter of land use decisions, the Chicago Plan is alarmingly depend-
ent upon market forces."16 Indeed, market forces determine not only
whether the development rights transferred will be saleable but also
dictate the price that they will command."17 The syllogism employed
to skirt this basic problem-that since development pressure endangers
landmarks in the first instance, if the pressure that creates a market
for development rights is absent, landmarks will not be in danger"1 8-
seems of dubious validity. Landmarks in New York, the city with the
most effective landmark preservation program in the nation, continue
to be imperiled despite reduced demand in the office space market
there. 1 9 The no-loss analysis simply will not withstand close
examination:
113. Because landmarks typically underutilize their site's development potential,
they constitute "light and air parks sprinkled throughout the central business dis-
trict like so many 'raisins' in the pudding." Id. at 64.
114. See Air Rights Transfers, supra note 59, at 378; Development Rights
Transfer, supra note 8, at 368; text at note 36 supra.
115. "Substituting the marketplace for government as the arbiter of private
land-use decisions . . . assumes a faith in the capacity of the marketplace to pro-
tect the public interest in environmental and land-use affairs that boggles the
mind of this disbeliever." Costonis, CXXVI Development Rights Transfer:
Descriptions and Perspectives for a Critique, 1, tape 575, ASPO Bettman Sym-
posium Lecture (1974) (tape transcript on file with the Urban Law Annual).
116. See SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 65-80.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See Air Rights Transfers, supra note 59, at 376; Development Rights
Transfer, supra note 8, at 368 n.155.
[Vol. 9:131
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol9/iss1/6
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS TRANSFER
Downtown development is usually not intensive enough to pro-
vide a ready market for development rights. Most downtown
areas now contain substantial amounts of vacant land and large-
scale land assembly, while expensive, is still possible without re-
course to the purchase of development rights. Most older cities
are also undergong decentralization of commercial and ind -
trial facilities. Even those with a healthy downtown area are
"overbuilt" in today's real estate market. More than half of
the 57 million square feet of office space built in New York City
in the last five years is still unoccupied.120
Market forces are difficult to predict even in the absence of direct
governmental intervention.12 1 Actions consciously intended to influ-
ence market decisions create uncertainties, such as the effect of im-
posing preservation costs on developers with which cities may be
unwilling or unable to cope. While such an imposition is rational
in that developers act out the market pressures that endanger land-
marks, cities may prove unwilling to risk diversion of economic de-
velopment from their jurisdictions by assessing preservation costs
to these developers.122
Finally, with regard to the legal issues posed,'123 the Plan must rely
heavily on a warm reception by a sympathetic judiciary124 Although
120. D. Fine, supra note 108, at 111-20 (emphasis added).
121. Markets are not perfectly competitive nor does perfect foresight reside in
them. Prices reflect expectations that may be false; there is nothing about the
market mechanism that transcends the fallibility of human opinions regarding the
future. See Hammond, Convention and Limitation in Benefit-Cost Analysis, 6
NATURAL RESOURCES J. 195, 205-06 (1966).
122. Chicago has, for the time being, rejected the Chicago Plan. See note 104
supra. Since Chicago's stated policy is to encourage compact development of its
central business district (see note 41 supra) it is entirely plausible that such con-
siderations may have played a part in that decision. On the other hand, the treat-
ment accorded the Chicago Plan by Chicago officials has been characterized by
"notorious posterior dragging. A kind of neanderthal negativism has marked
statements of (a Daley] administration spokesman." Huxtable, A Plan for Chicago,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1973, § 2, at 23, col. 3.
123. For a complete discussion of these see SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at
145-66; Chicago Plan, supra note 24, at 602-31.
124. The American judiciary has traditionally shown great deference to legislative
measures challenged on substantive due process grounds, striking down only those
measures without a rational basis. SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 161. Reliance
on judicial receptivity is not confined to challenges based on substantive due proc-
ess. See id. at 147, 150, 156, 163, 165. Perhaps the best example of this judicial
attitude is Justice Douglas' memorable dictum: "The concept of the public wel-
fare is broad and inclusive .... The values it represents are spiritual as well as
physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to
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there are indications that a well conceived development rights trans-
fer plan would be so received, 1 25 the only decided case even remotely
in point, Fred R. French Investing Co. v. City of New York,12 o indi-
cates that there is a limit to judicial tolerance. The City had at-
tempted to zone two Manhattan sites as public parks, compensating
the owner by allowing him to sell the sites' development rights to a
designated area elsewhere within the borough. The court found the
attempt to treat such a development rights transfer as compensation
offensive to the constitutional requirement of just compensation. 1"
Although ultimately decided on procedural grounds,12 8 the case in-
dicates a judicial unwillingness to tolerate the ad hoc carpentry
attempted by the City, whatever the "laudatory aspects of any project
designed for the public good"'12 9 may be.
CONCLUSION
The Chicago Plan for landmark preservation will probably not be
implemented fully in the near future because its complexity and prob-
lems exceed anything yet attempted in the historic preservation field.130
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as
well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled." Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 33 (1954). See also Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S.
62, 89 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
125. SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, at 161.
126. 77 Misc. 2d 199, 352 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct. 1973). For further commentary
see Marcus, Mandatory Development Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause: The
Case of Manhattan's Tudor City Park, 24 BUFFALO L. REv. 77 (1974).
127. 77 Misc. 2d 199 . ........ , 352 N.Y.S.2d 762, 766.
128. Id. at ........ , 352 N.Y.S.2d at 767. The City failed to follow the hearing
procedures of the zoning law in effecting the transfer.
129. Id. at ........ , 352 N.Y.S.2d at 766. Professor Costonis points out that under
the Chicago Plan no such hostility is to be anticipated, since "the risk of non-
marketability of development rights will fall on public authorities, not on the
owner of ecologically sensitive land. The latter . . . will be compensated under
traditional eminent domain procedures." Costonis, supra note 115, at 4 n.7, tape
579.
130. Already signs exist of progress toward complete implementation. Illinois
has enacted comprehensive enabling legislation that authorizes municipalities to
adopt development rights transfer plans. ILL. RFv. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 11-48.2-1 to
2-7 (Smith-Hurd 1971). More recently, a bill containing the basic elements of a
development rights transfer plan for historic preservation, including an optional
development rights bank, was introduced in the Hawaii House of Representatives.
Hawaii H.B. No. 130, 8th Leg., Jan. 28, 1975 (on file with the Urban Law An-
nual). The bill has twenty-six sponsors.
At this writing the chief obstacles to full implementation of such plans are found
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Because the), alter so many established zoning and property concepts,
developnent rights transfer programs will more likely evolve incre-
mentally, permitting gradual accommodation and adjustment be-
tween the transfer concept and the present system. Indeed, the promise
of the Chicago Plan will best be fulfilled if its ideas are carefully
tested and modified until they are acceptable to the public and private
sectors whose cooperation and commitment will be essential to the
Plan's success. As Professor Costonis notes:
[Tlhe full-fledged Chicago Plan is unlikely to be adopted in
Chicago. The city simply does not want a comprehensive land-
mark program that works because its relations with the develop-
ment sector and its commitment to monumentalism (e.g., [the]
John Hancock, Standard Oil [and] Sears buildings) rule out
any program that hinders large-scale land assembly. 31
Chicago's recent adoption of an amendment to its planned unit de-
velopiment ordinance"' is evidence that cities are more likely to pro-
(eed gradually. The amendment "does nothing less than award the
dcveloper bonus space for not destroying a landmark," which Profes-
sor Costonis terms a "modified TDR approach."' 3 Cities like New
York and Chicago have accepted the basic notion that the develop-
ment potential of a site can be severed and transferred elsewhere. It
is only a question of time and experience before they will have the
confidence to take the next step and cast those rights adrift.
It is as easy to say that development rights transfer will not work
as it was to say that man could not fly, simply because it has not yet
been done. Indeed some say that it could not and should not be
done.1' ' Nonetheless, despite numerous well-intentioned efforts to
at th' municipal level, shich has the mot potent political and market pressures.
''he cbnce, for effective implementation of a comprehensive development rights
tran,fur plan are best, hoswever, in a small, self-contained island environment such
as llasaii. Not only is development pressure intensive, but so little land area
rxist,, that the risk is minimal for diverting development outside the counties'
juisdictions by imposing the costs of preservation on developers. Hopefully,
llavaii's m deut plan will provide a showcase for the transfer concept that will
peruade ,,ther states and localities to follow its example.
1I. L,.tter from Professor John J. Costonis to Frederick M. Baker, Oct. 29,
1974 (on file vith the Urban Law Annual).
132. Slaes, supra note 104, at 8.
133. Letter, supra note 131.
1 . Pro, osor Costonis is fond of reproducing the comments of opponents of
deelopment rights transfer. See, e.g., Costonis, Whichever Way You Slice It,
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save our historic landmarks under existing preservation regimes, they
are rapidly disappearing. 35 Without attempting to minimize the
substantial obstacles in the way of effective implementation of a co-
herent transfer program, it might be noted that comprehensive zon-
ing was itself considered a pernicious device. The need for a plan
that considers the costs of preservation becomes apparent once it is
recognized that the problem of landmark preservation is essentially
economic. More significant, however, is the human cost of landmark
annihilation. Landmarks are vestiges of the past that embody the
history and culture of an America that no longer exists. If Ameri-
cans are to grow as a people they must understand their background.
It is unacceptable that our destiny as a people should include the
sense of rootlessness exacerbated by the loss of our landmark buildings.
In dosing his address to the American Historical Society in 1893,
Frederick Jackson Turner observed that "he would be a rash prophet
who should assert that the expansive character of American life has
now entirely ceased."' 36 He would also be a rash prophet who should
assert that development rights transfer has no future in the preserva-
tion of America's past.
DRT Is Here To Stay, 40 PLANNING 10 (July 1974) (" 'a gimmick' that 'can
only lead to an unplanned future-to chaos;' a 'pernicious device' deserving of
'censure rather than praise' ").
135. For illustrations depicting what remains-and what has been lost-see
SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 7, passim; Superville, supra note 3, at 517 ("A Century's
History of the Tall Building"); note 46 supra.
136. TURNER, supra note 2, at 37.
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